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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

This action was brought for damages for injuries
suffered when the plaintiff wets thrown to the ground
by the sudden movement of defendant's unattended
automobile as the plaintiff was attempting to alight
therefrorn.

DLSPOSITION IN LOWER GOUR T
Both parties moved for summary judgment at the

- I. -

pre -trial c0Ltf re nee, and filed n1emorandas in
1. :

support of their rnotions.

The Court granted the

plaintiff 1 s motion, ruling that the defendant was
negligent, that defendant 1 s negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, that
plaintiff was not negligent, and the the Utah "guest 11
statute did not preclude the plaintiff from recovery.
This appeal by the defendant is only from the last
finding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
-while the facts set forth in Appellant's Brief
are mainly accurate, the plaintiff does not accept the
defendant's conclusions, and deems it necessary to
point out additional facts relevant to the issue before
the Court.
At the invitation of the defendant, Mrs. Andrus
accepted a ride in the defendant's automobile to a
local restaurant for a sandwich.

Upon finishing their

meal, the parties returned to the plain.tiff's home,
arriving there at approximately 9:30 o'clock P· m.

After

vi:-;iLF"~

in Llic r_·ar for about five ininutes,

the p'1rt1es opened the <loors and began to get out.
Although the defendant had left the engine running,
the car in gear in drive positioa, and had failed to
properly set tbe b;:md brake, the car was stationary
as they began their exit.

On previous occasions the

plaintiff had n;quned no assistance when leaving the
defendant 1 s automobile, although this night, the
defendant decided to aid her.

However, she did not

tell Mrs. Andrus to stay in the car, nor is there any

evidence that she issued some warning or caution.
Deposition (R. 52), page 10; Answers to Interrogatories

(R. 8-10), Nos. 7 to 10, 18, and 21.
In tbe Appellant 1 s Brief relevant portions of the
plaintiff 1 s deposition are set forth detailing the events
that then transpired.

Mrs. Andrus stated that after

opening her door and facing tLe Cll1tside, with one foot
in the car and the other out {although she could not

ren1err1ber whether or not her right foot had touched

· .~ nd "itb.
her hand on the door handle, the
the groun d).
, cc.
".

-4-

c:ar

lJP!-,'.i.Lll

to rull forward.

The defendant, at the

rear of tf1e Cd r h y this tirne, heard the plaintiff yell,
"The car ls rolling!"

Deposition (R. 52), pages 7

to 9, and 11; Answers to Interrogatories (R. 9), No.

10.

Referring tu sequence, Mrs. Andrus further

testified:
"A.

. .. And i.t just seerned :.ike when I
was getting out of the car, it started
to roll, and I hung on. I hung on to
the door. 11 Depositio~i. (R. 52), page
7, lines 15 and 16.

Q.

Did you try to get yourself back in the
car and close the door?

A.

Yes, I did. I tried to pull myself in.
See, I held onto that there door, you
know. It had a catch on there, you
know> to open the door, and I held
onto that to try to pull myself back
in; and it just kept a rolling until it
th rowed j·ne off, off balance. n

and
11

In considering the testimony of Mrs. Andrus
regarding that, moment, it is evident that just as she
began rising fro1n the ::;eat, the car began rolling
forward_

~;he was far ennngh outside the car that she

w::is KllC!CkE.d ofl l1C:LL.l11c1:.~,

and, \.\hile tryring to pull

herself hctck iw:;1de, wets thrown to the ground,

Mrs.

Andrus was not certain as to how far the car rolled
before she was thrown and injured, although she
estirnated the car went some fifty feet before coming
to a stop against a parked auto1nobile.

Deposition

( R. 52), page 11.
At the time of the accident Mrs. Andrus was 74
yea rs old, lived <JJ ong, enjoyed good health, and was
able to care for herself.

Because of the broken hip

and broken shoulder suffered in the accident, it is
unlikely that she will ever walk normally again.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A GUEST AT THE TIME OF

THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY WITHIN THE MEANING
OF TBE UTAH GUEST STATUTE.
At

comm0~1

law a person wronged by another

perm_itted open acce!:is lo the courts to obtain redress
fo:r the injuries or d;_i_rn~-1.ges suffered.

This ancient

wa~

dufriors u1
Lo

Cir, cfi<irt to

pf'rfc:ct the recourse available

the citizens of this StatP.

Art. I, § 11, Constitution

of Utah provides:

'rALl courts sh;:ill be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in ~1is person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be adrr1in is te red without denial or unnecessary
delay; .. ,''
While our Court has not been faced with the
question of the constitutionality of the Utah guest
statute, the courts of many of our sister states have
considered this problem with the result being diverse
theories of the meamng and intent of the framers of
our c011stitutions.

So, while there is considerable

case law on the subject, there has been a complete
failure to a uniform

01·

general rule to rise out of the

mass of judicial cunfusiull.

111 A. L. R. 1011; C. J. S.,

Con. La\v, ~ 709, p. l2i7, n. 41.

The pLuntiff does not here suggest that the Utah;
guest statute abides

the constitutional guaranty of

- I' -

a right to

~1

;·ernPdy f,.Jr the injured, for we understand

this Court 1 s in Le rpretation of ''wilful mis conduct, " as

used in the statute, to n-1ean something less than an
intentional wrongdoing, thereby bringing our statute
within the holdings of the better-reasoned cases.
What pLuntiff does contend is that the guest
st-atute is in derogation, not only of the common law, but

also of the Constitution.

While under Section 68-3-2,

Utah Code Annotated, 19S3, a strict construction of a
statute contrary to the common law is not warranted in
this State, we do submit that a statute adverse on its
face to the clear rneaning of a provision of our Cons ti tu ti on, must be carefully applied, and strictly limited
to those situations obviously falling within the wording
of the act.

The guest statute, substantially limiting the

rights of a per::;on wronged to clairn compensation frorn
the 'Nrongdoes, rnust be cautiously administered.

A cau

of action cannot fail because of the guest statute unless
.:ill of

t}1e

prescribed conditions are rnet.

It is a

well-kno1.xJn princjp l (~ of statutory construction that

possible.

To i·1-_'.J.d

i11L0

the statute interpretations and

application::; contrary to the clear and concise wording
of the statute \voulcl violate not only the obvious intent
of the Legislature, but also

ti1e

protective and inalienable

guaranties of the Constitution.
The portion of the Utah guest statute here
perLi.neLlt provides:
''Any pecson who as a guest accepts a ride
in any vehiclP, moving upon any of the
publ1c highways of the state of Utah, and
while so riding as such guest receives or
sustains an injury, shall have no right of
recovery against the owner or driver or
person responsible for the operation of
such vehicle ... " Section 41-9-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.

The co11ditions thus required by this legislation are:
Thal a guest (1.) Accept a ride in any vehicle, (2) Moving
upo<1 any of the pul;Jic highways, (3) Receive or sustain
an injury, (4) Whi.le

~.;o

··iding as such guest.

Unless

all four ccmdi.tion::; .:tre satisfied by the evidence in a
particular c as c, the actio11 does not con1e within the
statute, and the plainti.ff ia

110L

dea1ed a right of

uJ

redress,

-

Pl;:irnt11L 11en, cunlt~nds that the instant

siLuation does not rneet the second and fourth requireinents, and U1at she is entitled to compensation.
Because of tlle nun1erous decisions of the courts
of various jurisdictions construing their respective
guest statutes not al all consistent with each other,
courtsel felt it essential to survey the guest statutes of
the various states, to deterrnine the underlying reasons
ior this inconsistency.

See Appendix.

Initially, it

v1as of interest to learn that but 2 7 stales have guest
statutes (the Ken tuck~, guest statute having been ruled
unconstitutional in VanGalder v. Foster, 243 Ky. 543,
49 S. W. L.d 352.).

Of these, two states have statutes

identical in wording Lo the Utah statute:
and Nevada.

North Dakota

The rernainder have statutes broader in

tt1eir applicatim1 than Lbe Utah act, since they do not
require co1nphance

''~th

as n1any conditions as are

set forth in our stalt1te;
l.

The gnesl ,st~.d.utes oi Colorado, Delaware,

Florida, Idaho, Kansas, !vfichigan, New Mexico

j fl -

Oreuon,
South C<-trol1n;i.,. South Dakota ' Virginia '
~
Washington, and Wyoming are identical.

They provide

that the defendant is not liable for injuries sustained by

a guest transported by the defendant, except under
special circumstan' cs.

There is not requirement that

the injury be inilicted while being trans ported or while
the automobile is moving upon the public highways.

The

Texas statute is the sarne except that it adds ''over the
public highways of this State.

11

The present Arkansas

statule (the prior guest statute was rule unconstitutional
in Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S. W. 2d

326) is similar to the Texas statute containing no
requirement that the incident occur while the guest is
riding.

2.

Iowa, Montana, Nebraska and Vermont

statutes all deny compensation for injuries sustained by
a guest riding in the host 1 s vehicle, although their
statutes do not specifir_:al1 y require the injury to be
occasioned while the guest is actua 11 y

II

so r1"d'ing II .

Th e

Illinois statute is identical except that it also includes

require th<tt the guest 1 s injuries be inflicted

11

while

being transported 11 before recovery is withheld, but
include

au

incident::; whether tbe )' happen upon the

_EJublic h::..gbways or cJsev,,here.

4.

An tr1teresting illustralion in the evolution

law is presented

[iy

the California legislatures.

Until

1935 (the year uf the enactment of the Utah guest
s tat:ute) the California guest statute was identical to
the present Utah

5

tatute.

Th,e 1935 California

Legislature amended that provision, removing some of
the con di. tions and making the statute broader in its
scope.

This statute was replaced with a new guest

statute in 1959 which is the broadest in purview of any
guest staLL1te cxam1nerL

It precludes the guest from

r•'CCO\;Cr\;
frorn' 1:1e owner or driver for inJ·uries
J

suntarned bec;:::,use of the de1cndant 1 s negligence, no
matter \,vherE: :.Le <::tc Ltdent takes pJace or ~vvhether the
guest is

111 ,

on c,r even o11tside th( vehicle at the time.

- l2 -

and per rnit re(' uveT y ,v] ,f·
and/ or cornnnt led s

u1

;-'"'

U1<~

defendant was intoxicated

,1e .Jct inure aggravated in nature

than mere negligence.

However, the obvious conclusion

which is the product of the foregoing study is this
caution:

T}1at in exan1ini11g the case law of other

jur1sd1ctions it is necessary· first to compare their
guest statute with ours, and then tu make certain that
proper distinctions are drawn.
The immediate matter is one of first impression
m Utah.

Likewise, counsel is unable to find any case

in North Dakota or Nevada {where the guest statute is
identical) where the particular issue now before the
Court was adjudic atc<l.

The California courts did

conside1 this very statute prior to its repeal, and
therefore supply us

\vjth

the only case law construing

a gue3t statute z1s lirnit1ng, frorn the standpoint of the
p1otection afforded the defendant, as ours.
The fiL·st case

Hl

\vl1ich the relationship was

2
considered was Moreas v. Fcrrv, 135 Cal.App. 20 ,

2.6 fJ. ,'.cl 8thJ,

VlH:CY!:

the defendant Lo

:1

plci_intif[ rode as

Li:e

theiltcr.

Tht:~

;:i_

guest with

theater was crowded

so the parties decided to go to another place of enter-

tainrnent.
the car.

The defendant requested the plaintiff to crank
The plaintiff cranked, the crank kicked,

plaintif£ 1 s arin was Lnuken.

The court held that under

such cirr:umstances Lhic.· injury 'vVas not inflicted in any
vehicle rnoving upon any higlnvay nor wl1ile the guest

.l\lthough the cases con st ruing a guest statute
identical to ours are lin1ited in numher, one was found
right in point, and cornpletel y analogous in all pertinent
particulars to the instant case.
Cal. Zd 89, 98 P
trip.

2d 72.9.

Prager v. Isreal, 15

There the parties were on a

Midway they stopped the car, got into the back

seat, and ate their hmch.

Upon finishing, they were

getting out of the l)ack seat to get into the front and
resurne their Journey.

The plaintiff was in the process

of alighting from the ca1.

With one foot on the ground

and the other on tlte ru~1niic~ boanl the car began to

pl<Hntiff ld lbc: g ruui1d and causing the injuries she
complained of.

The court s ai.d:

11

The definition of the term 'guest' must
be construed 1,vith the rest of the section
in which it dppears. The first paragraph
thereof sets forth the conditions under
which the guest, so defined, will be denied
re covP ry for injuries. Those conditions
are: When a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle 'moving upon any of the public
highways' and receives or sustains any
injury 'while so riding as such guest'.
It is clear that unless all of those conditions a1·e s a tis fi ed the plaintiff is not
such a guest as to he denied recovery."
The court went on to say that a person in the process
of alighting from an automobile, partly in and partly

out when it begins to move, cannot be said to be

11

riding"

in said automobile within the meaning of the statute.
Concluding; the court said:
''Fllrthr:c nnore, we think it clear that if
the defendant failed to park his automobile
in .'iuch a rnanner that it was safe for the
plaintiff Lo alight therefrom, or the automobile .,;vas in such a condition that it
could not have been so parked, and the
plaintiff suffered an injury in attempting
to alight the refron1 as a result oi the
s u.dden n1overnenl uf the automobile due

'

-·I

u t J ''
::JC'i

l1;·

~"llJ1i.

.1.-~.,i1,:.:v11, ''·

d t· fend ant to properly

ifw !_H·dkc:::;, he 'Nas guilty of

li sLtcft negligence was the

_rno:.;.unaL· 'a11se of the injury suffered by

she is entitled to recover
against hi1n." Emphasis added.

rl1P pla:1:fjLf,
d~nnages

There are but two differences rn the pertinent facts of
the cited case and Lbe cdse now before the Court:

In

the Prager case fui-Ll1er journey was yet contemplated
by the parties,

,vhf~reas

here the trip had terminated

five rninute s be fore the lnjur y was inflicted; and, in
the Prager cdse tbe pla1nt1ff actually had one foot on
the ground, 'Nhich ruay not have been the case with Mrs.
Andrus.

The California court, ho\-vever, made no

distinction so fine that it depended upon the exact place
of the plaintiffls feet at the time of the act complained
oi.

Rather, tbe court simply and correctly held that a

gucs t

1

'atternpLing to alight' 1 from the automobile could

not. be said to l.Je

11

riding" therein, and that the facts

therefore were OLltside the guest statute.
i\.ctuall y ~ it should be pointed out, the fact that
Mrs. Andrus

wci

s

i11

the process uf alighting from the

reall:,r crit.ic<J, fo1 .tt the time the defendant was also
outside the car, leaving the vehicle without a driver
or operator.

In coust.ruing tbe Iowa guest statute which

p1ovides:
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle
sh;:il.l not be liable for any damages to any
passenger or person riding in said motor
1eh1cle as a guest or by invitation and not
for hire ••• " Section 321. 494, Code of
Iowa, J 962,
'

1

1

the highest court of that state held that where the
plaintiff, atten1pting to enter the automobile, was
injured when the door fell off, she was not a guest
within the 111eaning of the statute since the defendant

vvas not in the car al the time, and since, therefore,
the re was no driver operating the car.

The journey

could not start until Lhe driver was in the car, and
until that time the plaintiff ~,v3.s not

11

riding in said motor

vehicle'' driven or operated uy a driver.

Pailthorpe, 20 7 lov,r;:i 613, 223 N. W. 254.
holding to the ca.se

110"\V

- t }le
beiore

c our t '

Puckett v.
Applying this
it cannot be

-1 I

said that Vt~·s. Andt u:-;

'Xds

"so riding as such guest"

in the defondantts auto1r2obile where the defendant was
outside the car at the time of the wrong and resulting
injury.
In addition to the failure of the instant case to
meet

au

of the conditions to the Utah guest statute, as th

well-reasoned Prager and Puckett cases demonstrate,
the plaintiff submits th..d.t there is further reason why the
guest statute is not here applicable to deprive her of
co1npensation for the injuries suffered and the expenses
incurred.

The host-guest relationship under the statute

is in the nature of an implied contract, and the conduct
and intent of the parties establish the status.

It

commcn<..:es w-ith the undertaking of transportation and
terrninates upon arrival at the agreed or implied destination.

774.

Owens v~ Young, 59 Wash. 2d_ _....., 365 P. 2d

Son1e cases have even gone so far as to hold the

relationship suspended temporarily during the period
after arrival at the primary destination and before
beginning the return trip.

Harrison v. Gamatero, 52

-11}-

Cdl. App. !.d l iB~ lS/. P., Zd 904.

Other cases have gone

even further, holding that a ternporary interruption in
the journey itseli, whether intended or not, suspends
the guest statute until the ride is resumed.

Ethier v.

Audette, 307 Mass .. ill, 29 N.E. 2d 707 {where the
parties,, enroute to plaintiff 1 s home, stopped at a
--

restaura..D.t to pick up food); Roh:r v. Employers
Liability Association Corp., Ltd., of London, 243
Wisc. 113, 9 N. W. 2d 627 {where the parties were
outside the auton1obile repairing a 'lat tire); Haskell v.
Per-kins, 16 Ill .. App. 2d 4Z8, 148 N. E. 2d 625 (where
the parties sto,?ped to assist a stranded motorist);
Clinger v., Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2dl56
(where the plaintiff left the car to see if another
passenger was ready to go, and was injured while
re -entering).

In the case before the Court, the journey had
ended live minutes before the negligent act of the
defendant ;:end the accompanying injuries to the plaintiff
were inilicted. With their arrival at the gate of Mrs.

iL

At t11a.t poiGt

(1

f ;u- ;-iv al, the gr atuitoll$ right of the

plaintiff expired and the i1nplied contract between the
parties tern1inated.

The subsequent act of the

defend;mt constituting negligence was not performed
in tr...c course of carrying out the gratuitous undertaking
wl<.ich she had aS5luned.
The hos r -guest relationship did not exist betweeu. the parties at the time of the injury, and Mrs.
Andrus is entitled to prosecute her claim against the
defendant in the courts of this State.
The cases cited in the Appellant 1s Brief are not
persuasive.

Inasmuch as there is no guest statute in

Massachusetts which the corresponding legislative
reqnirements and conditions, it is impossible to apply
the Slm<lry theories of the case law of that state to
the prese11l situation which is controlled by enactment.
The Ohio case cited by the defendant {Eskelman

v. Wilson, 80 N. F:. Zd 803) points out the fact that
every wonl in a statute must be given meaning if

){'
....._- __ \ }

pos:~ible,.

-

The .__,-,ncl!tiun there required by the guest

statute .i::; il1at the i~1jury take place while the guest was
in or upon the rnotor \rehicle.

Since the plaintiff in that

case was two feet away from the car it could not be
held that the ciLed condition was met, and she was
permitted recovery.

Of course, there is no such

condition in the Utah statute, ai1d the fact that M1·s.
P.Jldrut> was still partly in the car at the time of the
defendantts negligent act is immaterial.
Both of the Illinois cases rnentioned in the
Appellant 1s Brief {Tallios v. Tallios, 359 Ill. App. 299,
112 N .. E. Zd 723; Randolph v. Webb, 194 N.E.2d 379)
are distinguishable on the fa 1:ts.

fo. both cases the

injury occurred during the journey and while further
trip was contemplated by the parties.

The gratuitous

undertaking of the defenilant had not ceased.

The

implied contract between the parties was yet executory.
/As the Illinois court said, in the former case, the

host-guest relationship "is not interrupted or terminatec
by a tempora:cy aL;:;er. ce frorn the conveyance for a

re asu:1:inle dad u snal

pu.rpo~e.

•:

It i,;l1ould also be

rernembcred frat the Illinois guest statute does not
require the iujury to take place while the guest is
riding in the automobile nor upon the public highways
of the state, and thus aifords much broader protection
to the defendants and their insurance carriers than does
thA Utah statute.

The California case cited by defendant

(Frankenstein v,, House, 41 Cal. App. Zd 813, 107 P. Zd
624) is distinguished on the same ground.
CONCLUSION

At the rnornent of the commission of the wrong•

ful act and the infliction of injury, the host-guest
l:clationship previously existing between the parties had
tenninated.

The conditions of the Utah guest statute

were not satisfied since the injury was not sustained
sh.ile lvlrs. A.ndrus was
a vehicle

11

1

'so rirling as such guest" in

rnoving upon any of the public highways,

11

but while she was attempting to alight from the
driverless car of tlJe J(:}fendant.

To deny the plaintiff

her constitutional right of recovery would deprive the

guesL statute of it::; .-1e:u an<i

una1t1biguous meaning.

Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER and
CRAIG T. VINCENT
520 Bos ton Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent

APPENDIX. 0} c;UEST STATUTES

.Alabama
Arkansas
Califronia
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Ka...J.sas
Michigan
Ivf.ontana

Ne bra.ska
Nevada
New Mexico

North Dakota

Ohio
Oregon

Title 36, ~ 95, Code of Alabama,
Recompiled, 1958.
Section 75-913, Arkansas Statutes
Annotated, 194 7.
Section 17158, Deering 1 s California
Codes.
Section 13-9-1, Colorado Revised
Statutes, 1963.
Section 21-6101, Delaware Code
Annotated.
Section 320. 59, Florida Statutes, 1963,
Section 49-1401, Idaho Code.
Section 9-201, Illinois Annotated
Statutes,.
Section 47-1021, Burns Indiana
Statutes, Annotated.
Section 321, 494, Code of Iowa, 1962.
Section 8-122b, General Statutes of
Kans as, Annotated, 1949.
Section 256. 29, Compiled Laws,
Michigan, 1948.
Section 32-lll3, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, Annotated.
Section 39-740, Revised Statutes of
Nebraska, 1943.
Section 41.180, Nevada Revised
Statutes.
Section 64-24-1, New Mexico Statutes,
1953, Annotated.
Section 39-15-02, North Dakota Code,
Annotated.
Section 6308. 6, Page 1 s Ohil General
Code, Annotated.
Sec.lion 30.UO, Oregon Revised
Statutes.

South Carolina

South Dakota
Texas
Utah
1

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming

Secl.1011 46-801, Code of Laws of

South Carolina, 1952.
Section 44. 0362, Supplement to South
Dakota Gode of 1939.
Section 6 70lb, Vernon 1 s Texas
Statutes Annotated.
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
Title 23, Section 1491, Vermont
Statutes Annotated.
Section 8-646.1, Code of Virginia, 1950
Section 46. 08. 080, Revised Code of
Washington.
Section 31-233, Wyoming Statutes, 1957

